معدلات البطالة والمشاركة في سوق العمل 14-05-2026

غالباً ما يتركز النقاش الاقتصادي في الأردن حول رقم واحد: معدل البطالة. وعندما يقال إن البطالة تقارب 21%، يبدو وكأن هذا هو التحدي الأكبر الذي يواجه الاقتصاد. لكن هذه النظرة، رغم أهميتها، تخفي وراءها حقيقة أعمق: المشكلة الحقيقية ليست فقط في عدد العاطلين عن العمل، بل في عدد من هم خارج سوق العمل أساساً. وهنا يظهر مفهوم أقل تداولاً لكنه أكثر أهمية :معدل المشاركة في القوى العاملة.

يكمن الفرق بين معدل البطالة ومعدل المشاركة في القوى العاملة في من يتم قياسه مقارنةً بإجمالي السكان. البطالة تخبرنا كم شخصاً لا يعمل، لكن معدل المشاركة يخبرنا كم اقتصاداً لا نستخدمه بعد. وفي حالة الأردن، ورغم أهمية المؤشرين معاً، فإن معدل المشاركة في القوى العاملة يُعد غالباً التحدي الهيكلي الأكثر أهمية للتنمية طويلة الأجل.

فمعدل البطالة يقيس نسبة الأفراد ضمن القوى العاملة الذين لا يعملون لكنهم يبحثون عن عمل بشكل نشط. ويشمل فقط الأشخاص الذين يعملون أو يبحثون عن عمل، أي أنه لا يشمل من توقفوا عن البحث عن عمل، ومن هم خارج سوق العمل (طلاب، ربات منازل، محبطون). أما معدل المشاركة في القوى العاملة فهو يقيس نسبة السكان في سن العمل (15 سنة فأكثر) الذين ينتمون إلى القوى العاملة، أي الذين يعملون أو يبحثون عن عمل (عدد السكان في سن العمل مقسوما على حجم القوة العاملة). 

الفرق الأساسي بين المعدلين هو أنه يمكن أن يكون الشخص خارج القوى العاملة (غير نشط) دون أن يُعتبر عاطلاً عن العمل. فعلى سبيل المثال، إذا توقف خريج جامعي عن البحث عن عمل بسبب الإحباط، فإنه لا يُصنَّف عاطلاً عن العمل وفقاً للمعايير الرسمية، بل يخرج من القوى العاملة، مما يؤدي إلى انخفاض معدل المشاركة.

لماذا يُعد معدل المشاركة أكثر أهمية من معدل البطالة في الأردن؟ رغم أن معدل البطالة في الأردن للأردنيين مرتفع (حوالي21.4%  في أواخر 2025)، إلا أن معدل المشاركة في القوى العاملة يُعد من الأدنى عالمياً، حيث يبلغ حوالي37%  فقط. أي أن حوالي 60% من السكان في سن العمل لا يشاركون في العملية الإنتاجية. مما يجعل معدل المشاركة  أكثر أهمية.

يُعد الأردن من بين الدول ذات أدنى معدلات المشاركة في القوى العاملة على مستوى العالم، وخاصة فيما يتعلق بمشاركة النساء. يبلغ معدل المشاركة الكلي في القوى العاملة حوالي34% إلى 37% وفقاً لأحدث البيانات. أما مشاركة النساء في القوى العاملة فلا تتجاوز14%  إلى 15%، ما يضع الأردن ضمن أدنى خمس دول عالمياً في هذا المؤشر. 

تشير تقارير دولية إلى أن الأردن يُصنَّف ضمن أدنى المعدلات عالمياً، ويأتي في بعض التقديرات في المرتبة الرابعة عالمياً من حيث انخفاض مشاركة النساء، كما احتل تاريخياً مراكز متأخرة جداً (حوالي 140 من أصل 142 دولة) في مؤشرات الفرص الاقتصادية للنساء بينما يمتلك الأردن نساءً متعلمات بشكل جيد بل ومتفوق، لكن تدني معدل مشاركتهن في سوق العمل يعني أن حوالي85%  من النساء في سن العمل غير نشطات اقتصادياً، وهو ما يمثل، رغم الاستثمار في التعليم، مورداً بشرياً ضخماً غير مستغل. هذه المفارقة (تعليم مرتفع ومشاركة منخفضة) ليست مجرد خلل اجتماعي، بل خسارة اقتصادية ضخمة .

كما أن انخفاض معدل المشاركة يُخفي ما يُعرف بـ"البطالة المقنّعة". ففي الأردن أصبح حوالي 18% من الأشخاص الذين عملوا سابقاً خارج القوة العاملة، وتصل النسبة إلى23%  عند احتساب من لا يبحثون عن عمل حالياً.

ماذا لو احتسبنا القطاع غير المنظم أيضا؟ فحسب تقديرات مبنية على دراسات محكمة، يوظف القطاع غير المنظم في الأردن  40% – 50% من إجمالي العمالة. يحتسب جزء منها، وجزء آخر لا يحتسب أو ناقص القياس. إذا أُضيفت العمالة غير المحتسبة بالكامل، فإن  معدل المشاركة “الحقيقي” قد يرتفع إلى45% – 50%  تقريبا. مما يعني أن الصورة ليست سيئة كليا كما تبين الأرقام الرسمية، وأن الاقتصاد يستخدم عمالة أكثر مما يظهر رسمياً. لكن المشكلة تتحول من "بطالة" إلى انخفاض جودة العمل كون الأعمال غير مستقرة، والإنتاجية منخفضة، والدخل ضعيف، مع غياب الحماية الاجتماعية. حتى لو ارتفع معدل المشاركة في الأردن إلى نحو 50% عند احتساب القطاع غير المنظم، فإن التحدي الحقيقي لا يكمن فقط في عدد العاملين، بل في طبيعة هذه المشاركة، حيث تتركز نسبة كبيرة من العمالة في وظائف غير منظمة ومنخفضة الإنتاجية. وحتى مع احتساب القطاع غير المنظم يبقى الأردن أقل من المعدلات العالمية،(60%) ، وأقل بكثير من معدلات مشاركة الدول الناجحة (65–70%).

أيضا، ماذا لو احتسبنا مشاركة العمالة الأجنبية، التي تشارك بشكل رسمي وغير رسمي وتبلغ ( 600 – 800ألف( أي حوالي %40-%30 من إجمالي العمالة في الاقتصاد الأردني؟ إدخال العمالة الأجنبية في الحسابات يرفع معدل المشاركة في الأردن إلى نحو %50 بمعنى  أن الاقتصاد الأردني يعمل بمستوى أقل من طاقته الكاملة. لكن هذا يكشف في الوقت ذاته عن اختلال أعمق، حيث يعمل الاقتصاد بجهد غير أردني بدرجة كبيرة، فيما تبقى نسبة واسعة من الأردنيين خارج سوق العمل ليصبح التحدي الحقيقي ليس في حجم النشاط، بل في من يشارك.

أي أننا حتى مع إدخال العمالة غير المنظمة والعمالة الأجنبية، فإن حجم المشاركة لا يزال منخفضا. ما هي أسباب انخفاض معدل المشاركة؟ تشير الدراسات إلى أن انخفاض نسبة المشاركة في الأردن لا يعود أساساً إلى العادات الاجتماعية، بل إلى عوائق هيكلية مثل ضعف وسائل النقل العام، ونقص خدمات رعاية الأطفال بأسعار مناسبة، ومحدودية فرص العمل المرنة. لذلك، فإن معالجة هذه العوائق تُعد الطريق الأكثر فعالية لتحقيق التنمية، مقارنةً بمحاولة خفض البطالة فقط ضمن القوى العاملة الحالية.

إن مضاعفة معدل المشاركة يعد هدفاً رئيسياً في رؤية التحديث الاقتصادي الأردنية، لما له من أثر كبير على الناتج المحلي الإجمالي، الإنتاجية، الإيرادات الضريبية، وتخفيض نسبة الدين الى الناتج. فانخفاض معدل المشاركة في القوى العاملة في الأردن ليس مجرد مؤشر اقتصادي، بل يعكس وجود طاقة بشرية كبيرة غير مستغلة في الاقتصاد. ولهذا السبب، يرى العديد من الاقتصاديين أن التحدي الحقيقي في سوق العمل الأردني لا يقتصر على البطالة، بل يكمن أيضاً في ارتفاع نسبة غير المشاركين اقتصادياً، خاصة من النساء. فإذا كانت البطالة تعكس "حالة الاقتصاد اليوم"، فإن معدل المشاركة يعكس قدرة الاقتصاد على النمو في المستقبل.

يجب أن نتقبل ظاهرة أن الأردن لا يعاني فقط من بطالة مرتفعة، بل من اقتصاد لا يستخدم كامل طاقته البشرية. وإذا كان الهدف هو تحقيق تنمية مستدامة، فإن التحدي الأكبر ليس فقط في توفير وظائف، بل في إدخال وإعادة إدخال مئات الآلاف إلى سوق العمل.

نشر في جريدة الرأي الاردنية

https://alrai.com/article/10957184/كتاب/معدلات-البطالة-والمشاركة-في-سوق-العمل

 

If Robinson and Mazzucato assessed Jordan’s economy

A side from the current crises and turmoil in the region, which are likely to subside soon without causing significant harm to Jordan, this article presents a hypothetical scenario of a visit by two prominent economists to the Kingdom. I am invoking some of their most famous quotes here to highlight a different perspective on the Jordanian economy.

Imagine that two of the most prominent economic minds, Joan Robinson (born 1903) and Mariana Mazzucato (born 1968), arrived in Amman and met at a coffee shop to assess the Jordanian economy. The late Joan Robinson was a prominent economist from Cambridge University and a sharp critic of uncompetitive markets. She believed that the economy should be understood as it is, not as models assume it to be. The second, Mazzucato, is one of the most prominent contemporary economists, who redefined the state's role as a creator of value, not merely a regulator or corrector, and is considered one of the most important figures to have reshaped the state's role in the economy.

The discussion wouldn't be limited to numbers. It would delve into how the economy actually functions, how added value is created, and how the state and the market can work together to build a more productive and sustainable economy.

What would they say? Robinson would begin, in her characteristically critical tone, with her famous line: "The goal of studying economics is not to find ready-made answers, but to learn how not to be fooled by economists." She would then examine Jordan's economic indicators and ask a simple yet sharp question: "Does this economy reflect what the models say… or do the models ignore its reality?"

Joan Robinson would pose her favourite question: "Is this truly a competitive economy, or is it one shaped by invisible monopolistic forces?" and "Are the markets competitive… or is competition merely a theoretical construct?" She would look at certain sectors and observe that the number of players is limited, that prices don't fall easily after rising — meaning they are sticky — and that production isn't expanding at the desired pace. She would say, "If markets aren't competitive, don't expect strong investment or high growth." And, "The problem isn't the market itself… It's how the market works."

Robinson would quickly turn to the labour market. She would not only be concerned by the unemployment rate but also by its persistence. For her, high unemployment over many years doesn't signify a cyclical fluctuation but a deeper flaw in the structure of the economy. She would say, "If unemployment persists, the problem isn't wages… It's demand that isn't generating production." She wouldn't stop there, but would add, "And if demand isn't translated into domestic production, you're not just suffering from a lack of demand… but from its leakage." She thus puts her finger on one of the most important issues in the Jordanian economy: that a large portion of spending doesn't remain within the economy.

Here, Mariana Mazzucato would enter the discussion, shifting the focus and asking, "You're talking about the market… but where is the state in all of this?" In her view, the problem in many countries isn't whether the state is large or small, but rather that the state is "not oriented towards value creation." She would examine economic policies and ask: "Is there a clear production vision?… Is investment directed toward future sectors?… Is the state leading innovation… or waiting for the market?… The state is not just a corrector of market failures, but a partner in creating markets."

Mazzucato would note that Jordan possesses important elements, including relative stability for more than half a century, a strategic geographic location, and an educated human capital base. She would further point out that these elements have not yet been translated into a well-defined economic project, since "The economy does not grow only through stability, but through direction."

They would both agree on a central point: not all spending is created equal. Robinson would say: "If spending does not generate local production, it has little impact… It is real growth that changes the economy's capacity to produce, not just its size." Mazzucato would add, "Value is not created in consumption, but in innovation and production… and if it is not directed toward creating future value, it is wasted spending."

The dialogue would lead to the concept of the economic multiplier and the crucial question: Will a spent dinar remain within the economy, circulating to drive demand and then supply? Or will it quickly flow out through imports? Robinson would argue, "If the dinar isn't circulating within the economy, don't expect a significant impact." Mazzucato would add, "And if it's not directed towards creating future value, it's aimless spending."

After a lengthy discussion, they agreed on a three-pronged diagnosis: First, there is high economic leakage, with a large portion of demand flowing abroad, thus weakening the impact of spending on growth. Second, the market structure lacks competition, as some sectors discourage expansion and investment. Third, the state's role needs to be geared towards creating productive value.

Robinson suggested fostering genuine competition, breaking up inefficient monopolies, and linking prices and production to reality, not just models. Mazzucato, on the other hand, emphasised directing investment towards strategic sectors, building national priorities around areas such as water, energy, and industry, and making the state an innovation partner, not merely a regulator.

And they both agreed on one thing: "The problem isn't the size of the economy… It's its quality." They might leave behind a recommendation — simple yet profound: "Don't just ask: How much is the GDP growing? Ask instead: What are we producing, how are we producing it, and for whom?"

While this is an imaginary visit, it raises a real question: Do we want an economy that simply grows, or one that produces, innovates, and is sustainable?

The writer is a former Minister of State for Economic Affairs in Jordan

Published in Jordan Times/ March 25, 2026

https://jordantimes.com/opinion/yusuf-mansur/if-robinson-and-mazzucato-assessed-jordans-economy

What if the war drags on?

Amid regional tensions, there is much talk about war and its effects. Still, the most important economic question for Jordan is not military, but purely financial: How much can the budget sustain if the crisis drags on?

So far, Jordan is not facing an energy supply crisis. Electricity is available, and supplies have not been interrupted. But the real challenge lies in the cost of this energy. Official estimates indicate that the government is incurring additional costs in the energy sector, ranging between JOD 2.5 million and JOD 3 million daily, due to rising fuel prices and the need to switch to more expensive alternatives for electricity generation.

The number of JOD 3 million, despite its apparent simplicity, means (based on current oil and gas prices) that every additional day of the war places a direct burden on Jordan's public finances. If translated over time, just one month would mean approximately 90 million dinars, and this figure could reach JOD 270 million within three months, exceeding half a billion dinars if the crisis lasts for six months and energy costs do not rise further than their current level.

But these figures cannot be interpreted in isolation. Jordan enters this crisis already operating within a limited fiscal space (fiscal inflexibility), with a budget deficit approaching 5% of GDP and a public debt hovering around 88% of GDP (excluding the amount borrowed from the Social Security Fund). The current figures are manageable under normal circumstances, but they become more vulnerable in the face of external shocks.

To understand the situation more accurately, it is necessary to consider the potential scenarios for the war's sustainability, adhering to the principle of "if you want to predict, predict a lot." The most likely assessment at present is that the war will not be very short, nor fully all-out, but rather will take the form of a limited, prolonged escalation. This scenario, which could last between two and four months, carries a probability, according to research institutes, of approximately 50% to 60%, and is the basis for most international economic analyses.

In this scenario, the cost of additional energy could rise to around JOD 270 million within three months, potentially pushing the deficit to 5.5% or more and gradually increasing the debt ratio. Economic growth is also expected to slow to between 1.8% and 2.1%, due to rising costs and a decline in some sectors, particularly tourism.

If the crisis is short (for example, one month), the impact remains relatively limited. The deficit will rise slightly, and growth will slow down slightly, but the economy can absorb the shock. This scenario has a lower probability, around 25% to 30%.

Conversely, there remains a more negative scenario: a regional expansion of the war and its continuation for a longer period. This scenario, although less likely (15% to 25%), has a much greater impact. The deficit could rise to 6% or more, and debt could approach 90% of GDP, with growth slowing to 1% or less.

There is a final scenario, less likely but would be the costliest: a long and comprehensive war. In this case, the deficit could exceed 7%, and debt could approach 91% or more, with very weak or near-zero growth. However, this scenario is still far from the baseline forecasts at present.

What do these scenarios mean in practical terms? They mean that the real danger lies not in the daily figure (JOD 3 million), but in the accumulation of this amount over time. One month means manageable financial pressure, three months means clear economic pressure, but six months or more could mean a shift in the course of public finances.

In this context, the government's decision not to pass on the price increases directly to citizens is understandable. This decision protects domestic demand, prevents inflation from spreading rapidly through the economy, and maintains social stability. However, it also means that the state is effectively postponing the cost rather than eliminating it. Herein lies the paradox: the government's success today in protecting citizens from price hikes is offset by increasing pressure on the budget in the future.

Is this decision correct? In crises, it is often correct. Immediately passing on the shock could lead to sharp inflation and a greater economic slowdown (stagflation). But this option cannot be sustained indefinitely without a cost. It requires economic flexibility: a change not only in the types of energy we consume, but also in how, where, and by whom goods are produced.

Therefore, the real challenge is not in paying the cost, but in managing it—that is, how to distribute it over time, mitigate its impact, and reduce its recurrence in the future. Ultimately, Jordan is not facing an energy crisis, but a price crisis, and this is a crucial distinction. The first crisis (energy) means an economic standstill, while the second (prices) means financial pressure that can be managed, but cautiously. Wars aren't fought only on battlefields; they're financed in budgets and felt in prices.

The most important message today is this: the situation is under control in terms of energy availability, but it's financially costly. The shorter the crisis, the more limited its impact will be. If it lasts longer, the question will shift from: How much are we losing daily? To: How much can we endure before we change our policies?

*The writer is a former Minister of State for Economic Affairs in Jordan

Published in Jordan Times/April 1, 2026 

https://jordantimes.com/opinion/yusuf-mansur/what-if-the-war-drags-on

Between Amman and Istanbul: Investment procedures and incentives

Jordan recently approved (April 2026) new amendments to its investment environment within the Economic Modernization Vision. Meanwhile, Turkey announced a very strong investment package during the same month. It is worth noting that the moves of both countries aimed at attracting investments amid recent regional developments are critically important for each of them.

Jordan's reforms are, at their core, deep institutional and regulatory reforms aimed at reducing complexity, building confidence, and improving the business environment. The latest reform of Jordan's investment system focused on simplifying procedures and reducing bureaucracy — removing overlaps between regulations, unifying regulatory concepts, and reducing licensing time and cost — in order to shift investment legislation from a complex administrative system to one that is clearer and faster to implement.

The amendments also introduced a new concept that has been used in several countries, such as Hong Kong (since 1990), Singapore (2000), the Netherlands (2000), the UK (2008), Saudi Arabia (2019), and the UAE (2018), among others. The concept is "licensing in exchange for commitment," whereby the system allows a license to be granted before the full legal procedures are completed, with compliance verified afterward. This is an important shift from the "strict prior approval" model — which can delay the start of investment and thus postpone its benefits — to a system based on trust and subsequent oversight. This step, however, requires competent monitoring and follow-up.

Additionally, investment incentives were expanded so that they no longer apply solely to new projects, but now also cover expansions and reinvestment, thereby encouraging existing investment and not just new investment. This is a rational and welcome step.

In line with the Modernization Vision, the reforms also support sustainable investments and job creation by linking incentives to employment and sustainability, and improve the quality of government services through the digitization of procedures and enhanced institutional efficiency.

What has Turkey done recently (2025–2026)? Turkey has introduced substantial financial incentives — incentives that Turkey can afford, given its economy of approximately $1.6 trillion, roughly 27 times the size of Jordan's economy. Its public debt-to-GDP ratio is around 25–35%, which is very low compared to Jordan's ratio of 118%.

Turkey announced a very powerful investment package in recent days (April 2026), including a significant reduction in corporate tax to 9% — down from 25% — for industrial exporters, and 14% for other exporters. It also offered broad tax exemptions, including a full or near-full exemption on transit trade and foreign profits, a 20-year tax exemption for non-resident foreign individuals, and a 0% tax on foreign income for 20 years — a highly attractive measure for capital flows. Direct financial incentives were also provided (customs and tax exemptions, social insurance support, interest subsidies, and land allocation), along with a $30 billion technology investment support program. On the procedural side, Turkey adopted

a "one-stop shop" system through a single platform covering company establishment, permit issuance, tax payment, and residency grants.

Jordan and Turkey are not competing with the same tools to attract investment. Jordan relies on an "environment improvement" model — reducing transaction costs and enhancing institutional trust — whose impact will be felt over the medium term. Nevertheless, it is well-suited to Jordan's economy, which is small, resource-limited, and boasts security and stability.

The Turkish model, on the other hand, can be called a "profitability stimulation" model — it significantly cuts taxes and directly increases return on investment — with an impact felt in the short to medium term. It is suited to a large industrial economy that relies on exports.

Jordan's recent reforms represent an institutional shift toward simplifying procedures and improving the business environment, while Turkey relies on broad tax and financial incentives to rapidly boost investment attractiveness. Although the Turkish approach may have a greater impact on short-term investment flows, the Jordanian approach could prove more sustainable in the long run — provided it is accompanied by targeted financial incentives.

The author is a former Minister of State for Economic Affairs, Jordan 

Published in Jordan Times/April 26, 2026 

https://jordantimes.com/opinion/yusuf-mansur/between-amman-and-istanbul-investment-procedures-and-incentives

Tomatoes in the perfect storm

Whenever tomato prices spike in Jordan, many of us find ourselves asking the same question: Is it because of exports? It’s a natural conclusion to draw—the idea that our produce is being "pulled" away to foreign markets, leaving locals with the bill. But while that answer is simple and popular, it misses a much deeper truth. The real issue isn't the exports themselves; it’s the way our agricultural system is built.

Looking back at the history of tomato prices in Jordan, we see a pattern of sharp, unpredictable swings. We’ve seen prices drop below 0.10 JOD per kilogram in some seasons, only to climb above 1.50 JOD in 2026. These peaks are getting higher, showing that our market is becoming more sensitive to small disruptions and rising costs.

These aren't just random events. They are symptoms of a recurring cycle of loss, surplus, and shortage. Essentially, our agricultural sector lacks the stability it needs to stay balanced.

What we’ve experienced recently is what economists call a "supply shock." A sudden drop in available tomatoes naturally sent prices climbing. This year, Jordan faced a "Perfect Storm"—a series of unfortunate events hitting all at once:1. Unpredictable Weather: Harsh cold spells in the Jordan Valley slowed down the ripening of crops. 2. The Planting Gap: Natural timing gaps between seasons left the market temporarily empty. 3. Farmer Hesitation: Most importantly, many farmers simply chose not to plant tomatoes this year. Why? Because they lost so much money in previous seasons when prices collapsed.

This creates a painful cycle: one year of losses leads to fewer crops the next year, which causes a shortage. Then, high prices tempt everyone to plant again at once, leading to a surplus and another crash.

While it’s easy to point fingers at exports, the facts tell a different story. In reality, when prices get too high, the government often steps in to limit or stop exports entirely. This is proof that the problem isn't external demand—it's a lack of supply at home.

While exports can play a small role, no solid data suggests that shipments to Israel or the Gulf were the main drivers of this year's price hike. Exports are often the "scapegoat" for a crisis that actually started in Jordan’s own fields.

The tomato crisis highlights a significant gap in our system: a lack of planning. In more advanced agricultural economies, there is a clear "agricultural map" that helps decide what to plant, where, and when.

In Jordan, these big decisions are often left to individual farmers who are forced to guess what the market will do. Without accurate information or institutional guidance, they are essentially gambling on their harvest. This instability hurts everyone—it drives up the cost of living for families and makes life precarious for the farmers we rely on.

The answer isn’t to ban exports. Doing so only hurts our farmers in the long run and cuts them off from the global economy. Instead, we should focus on: 1. Better Data: Giving farmers real-time info on production and prices so they can plan better. 2. Strategic Planning: Creating a national map for crop distribution. 3. Support Systems: Investing in better storage, refrigeration, and "contract farming" to protect farmers from sudden losses.

By moving away from "quick fix" bans and toward real structural reform, we can create a market that is fair for the farmer and affordable for the kitchen table.

The writer is a former Minister of State for Economic Affairs in Jordan

Published in Jordan Times / April 28, 2026

https://jordantimes.com/opinion/yusuf-mansur/tomatoes-in-the-perfect-storm

Online Gambling: The Silent Economic Drain

In light of rapid digital transformation, gambling is no longer confined to physical venues or specific contexts; it has become accessible with the click of a button on a mobile phone. Although gambling in all its forms is legally prohibited in Jordan, reality indicates a growing spread of what can be described as “invisible online gambling,” particularly among young people. This phenomenon is no longer merely a legal or moral issue—it has evolved into an economic and social challenge that deserves serious discussion.

The problem begins with a simple yet profound factor: ease of access to gambling platforms. Today, a young Jordanian does not need a social network or a special environment to enter the world of gambling; a smartphone, an internet connection, and perhaps a digital wallet or cryptocurrency are enough. This transformation has made gambling an individual, isolated activity, yet at the same time widespread and difficult, though not impossible, to monitor.

But why youth in particular? The answer lies in the intersection of several factors. First, unemployment drives some to search for “alternative opportunities” to generate quick income, even if risky. Second, the rise of digital culture, in which video games increasingly incorporate gambling-like elements such as betting and “loot boxes,” a common feature in which players pay real or in-game currency for a box containing unknown rewards determined by chance, creates a gradual pathway from entertainment to gambling. Third, the indirect influence of digital advertising, which promotes lifestyles centered on quick gains and risk-taking.

The seriousness of this phenomenon cannot be understated. Economically, the World Health Organization estimates that about 1.2 per cent of adults worldwide suffer from gambling disorder, and global gambling industry revenues could reach $700 billion by 2028, driven primarily by smartphones and digital platforms. Additionally, 46.2 per cent of adults and 17.9 per cent of adolescents worldwide have engaged in some form of gambling within a single year.

In Jordan, there are no officially published figures on the size of online gambling, but we do have an important baseline: youth aged 15–24 constitute about 20 per cent of the population—approximately 2.3 million individuals out of 11.7 million in 2025.

Let us assume, for illustration, that only 1 per cent of Jordanian youth engage regularly in online gambling. This would amount to about 23,000 individuals. If each loses an average of 50 Jordanian dinars per month, the annual loss would reach approximately 13.8 million dinars. If the share rises to 3 per cent, losses increase to about 41 million dinars annually, and at 5 per cent, they approach 69 million dinars.

These figures may not seem large compared to Jordan’s GDP, which reached approximately JOD 43.7 billion in 2025. However, they become significant because they are concentrated among a financially vulnerable age group, and because a large portion of this money flows to foreign platforms instead of circulating within the domestic economy.

If these funds were instead spent locally—on education, transportation, restaurants, clothing, training, or small businesses—their economic impact would exceed the original amount due to the “multiplier effect.” A loss of JOD 40–70 million annually in youth spending could translate into a broader loss of economic activity estimated at JOD 200–350 million (based on recent multiplier studies), potentially costing hundreds or even thousands of direct and indirect jobs, particularly in small service sectors that rely heavily on household and youth spending.

Online gambling does not generate real value added within the economy; rather, it functions as a channel for income leakage abroad. Most platforms used by Jordanian players are based outside the country, even if payments are sometimes processed through local accounts, meaning that these outflows represent a direct drain on foreign currency. In an economy already facing a current account deficit and pressure on foreign reserves, such leakage cannot be ignored.

More critically, online gambling affects not only income but also economic behavior among youth: it reduces savings, increases borrowing, delays marriage (thereby contributing to social instability), postpones education or entrepreneurship, and transforms the smartphone from a tool of productivity and knowledge into a channel of financial depletion.

The shift in spending patterns negatively affects medium-term growth. Repeated losses may push individuals to borrow or sell assets, increasing household financial vulnerability. Thus, even if the visible cost appears limited relative to GDP, its social and developmental impact is substantial because it directly affects Jordan’s human capital.

The impact is more complex at the labor market level. Gambling does not create jobs; rather, it may indirectly increase unemployment by reducing investment and productivity. A young person engaged in addictive behaviors such as gambling—an addiction comparable in severity to substance abuse—gradually loses the ability to focus and work effectively, which negatively affects job performance and future opportunities. At this point, the issue shifts from an individual problem to a collective economic burden.

Socially, psychologically, and economic dimensions are deeply intertwined. Gambling addiction is associated with higher levels of anxiety and depression and may lead to family breakdown or engagement in illegal activities to cover losses. These indirect costs do not appear in national accounts, but they are real and significant.

Given this situation, a fundamental question arises: Is legal prohibition sufficient? Experience suggests that prohibition alone, in the digital age, is no longer enough. Technology transcends borders, and traditional regulation struggles to keep up with constantly evolving platforms and applications. This does not necessarily imply advocating for the legalization of gambling, especially in a conservative society, but it does call for a more comprehensive and intelligent approach.

The solution does not lie in a single policy but in a mix of measures. First, digital monitoring must be strengthened by tracking electronic payment patterns linked to gambling and cooperating with technology companies to block suspicious platforms. Second, video games that incorporate gambling elements, especially those targeting youth, should be regulated and monitored. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the economic root causes must be addressed. Young people who have access to real employment opportunities and clear career paths are less likely to engage in high-risk behaviors. This highlights the importance of employment policies, entrepreneurship support, and expanding vocational training programs.

Awareness also plays a crucial role, but only if it is realistic and grounded in economic understanding, not merely moral preaching. Young people must recognize that gambling is not a path to wealth but a mechanism for redistributing losses and increasing poverty, often at their expense.

In conclusion, online gambling in Jordan represents a “silent drain,” one that is not easily visible but has deep economic and social consequences. Ignoring this phenomenon may prove costly, not only in financial terms but also in terms of societal stability and the future of generations.

Published in Jordan Times /May 4, 2026:

https://jordantimes.com/opinion/yusuf-mansur/online-gambling-the-silent-economic-drain

Will Jordan’s mega projects become a path to permanent development?

Jordan today stands before an extraordinary opportunity: To transform the benefits of being an oasis of stability in a region full of turmoil from one or two-year growth rates into sustainable development and a permanent economic advantage built on water, energy, transport, logistics, and production.

The Economic Modernisation Programme 20262029 includes 392 projects, with private-sector partnerships amounting to nearly JD10 billion, especially in energy, water, transport, and infrastructure.

 The government also notes that the indicative direct cost of the executive programme is about JD3.9 billion.

The main projects proposed so far include: The National Water Carrier, the Aqaba–Shidiya railway, the national railway network Aqaba–Amman, development of Aqaba’s container port, the multipurpose port, development of King Hussein Airport in Aqaba, the new King Hussein crossing, electrical interconnection with Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, renewable energy and storge projects, green hydrogen and ammonia, development of the Risha gas field and pipeline, the Amman–Zarqa bus rapid transit, road projects with toll systems, Amra City and the medical university in partnership with the Saudi-Jordanian Investment Fund.

The importance here is not only in the number or size of projects, but in the fact that they address some of the constraints that have long hindered Jordan’s economic development: Water scarcity, high energy costs, weak logistical connections, and high transport costs. If these projects are treated as one integrated system, they will not only create temporary growth but also open the door to permanent development.

 The importance here is not only in the number or size of projects, but in the fact that they address some of the constraints that have long hindered Jordan’s economic development: Water scarcity, high energy costs, weak logistical connections, and high transport costs The main projects proposed so far include: The National Water Carrier, the Aqaba–Shidiya railway, the national railway network Aqaba–Amman, development of Aqaba’s container port, the multipurpose port, development of King Hussein What is the expected impact on output? If we assume that the major investments of about JD10 billion are implemented over four years, this means an annual injection of about JD2.5 billion. Since Jordan’s estimated GDP is around JD38–43 billion, this equals roughly 6 per cent of GDP annually before accounting for the multiplier effect.

The Ministry of Finance estimated outstanding debt (excluding Social Security Investment Fund holdings) at about JD35.08 billion, or 91.5 per cent of GDP in Q1 2025, implying a nominal GDP close to JD38.3 billion in that report.

Assuming a conservative spending and investment multiplier (the total increase in GDP resulting from an initial in about 77 per cent.

This is the core idea: The best way to reduce the debt burden is not austerity alone, but expanding the size of the productive economy.

 If projects turn into production and exports rather than just capital spending, Jordan’s real growth could exceed the 2.7 per cent forecast by the IMF (increase in spending) between 1.2 and 1.5. This package of projects could generate a cumulative impact on GDP ranging between JD12 and JD15 billion over several years. In other words, the economy could move, if projects are implemented and linked to production and exports, from an output of about JD40 billion to a nominal output approaching JD52–55 billion in the medium term — not just because of spending, but because of the industries and services it creates.

 Energy should not only secure electricity, but also reduce production costs and attract investment. What is the impact on public debt? Debt is not measured only by its value, but by its ratio to GDP. If debt remains around JD35.1 billion and GDP rises to JD52 billion, the debt ratio falls arithmetically from 91.5 per cent to about 67 per cent of GDP. Even if nominal debt rises to JD40 billion due to financing some projects, its ratio to a GDP of JD52 billion becomes. How does development become permanent? For lasting impact, projects must be treated as productive economic corridors.

 The railway should not only transport phosphates, but also create chemical and manufacturing industries around phosphates and potash.

 The port should not only serve shipping, but also reexport, storage, and logistics services. Water should not only be for consumption but also support high-value industries and agriculture. Energy should not only secure electricity, but also reduce production costs and attract investment. In this way, Jordan becomes a true logistics hub, not just a safe country through which trade passes. The difference is significant: Temporary transit yields limited income, while production linked to transit creates jobs, exports, and permanent tax revenues.

If these projects are implemented as an interconnected package, linked to industrial zones, exports, and the private sector, Jordan can transform the effects of the regional crisis from a passing circumstance into a strategic opportunity. Then, the benefit from regional turmoil will not be temporary as in the past, but will become a permanent advantage, thus making Jordan a safe, productive, logistical, and regionally connected hub. Jordan does not only need to build roads, railways, and ports, but to build an economy that uses them to support exports and production; expanding the economic base, reducing the debt ratio, and turning projects into pillars of development.

The author is a former minister of state for economic affairs

Published in the Jordan Times:

https://jordantimes.com/opinion/yusuf-mansur/will-jordans-mega-projects-become-a-path-to-permanent-development 

Estonia: From Basement to Summit

In this article, I share the story of Estonia's rise and development journey, for it holds lessons and insights that are well worth reflecting on. Estonia is one of those miracle states that started from zero or close to it and rose to become one of the most advanced countries in the world and a model worthy of emulation.

When Estonia gained independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it did not stand on the threshold of a success story — it stood on the edge of a deep economic collapse. The Estonian economy at the time was a crumbling centrally planned system: institutions were virtually absent, the currency was unstable, and the infrastructure was weak.

It was a critical historical moment. This small country found itself facing two choices: attempt to reproduce a slow, conventional economic model, or leap directly toward the future. Estonia chose the harder and smarter path.

In the early 1990s, the average income in Estonia was extremely low, with per capita income estimated at around $3,000 per year — less than $250 per month. Wages were volatile due to inflation and the monetary transition. Today, just three decades later, annual per capita income exceeds $30,000, with an average monthly wage surpassing $2,500. This transformation is not merely a gradual improvement; it is a structural leap that reflects a comprehensive rebuilding of both the economy and society.

What did Estonia do to bring about this transformation? It began with radical economic reform. The government did not hesitate to liberalize prices rapidly, privatize broad sectors, and open the economy to trade and investment. The goal was clear: to transition from a closed, inefficient economy to a competitive market economy integrated into the global system. But the reform was not only economic — it was also institutional and intellectual. Rather than building a complex system, Estonia chose simplicity as a strategy.

At the heart of that simplicity was the tax system. Estonia adopted a flat income tax — a single rate for everyone — but more importantly, it added a revolutionary element: exempting reinvested profits from taxation. With this move, the tax system was transformed from a tool of collection into a tool for stimulating growth, encouraging companies to expand rather than distribute profits.

Yet the real transformation was not in taxes but in people. In 1996, the government launched the "Tiger Leap" program, which aimed to bring the internet into schools, train teachers, and integrate technology into education. The goal was not merely to modernize the curriculum but to build an entirely digital generation. This generation, which learned coding and technology use from an early age, later became the backbone of Estonia's digital economy.

In parallel, Estonia decided to build a digital state from scratch. Every citizen received a digital identity used in all transactions — from voting to paying taxes to signing contracts. The "X-Road" platform was created: a digital infrastructure linking all state institutions and enabling the secure and efficient exchange of data without centralization. This platform was not merely a technical system; it was a redefinition of how the state itself operates.

As a result, 99% of government services in Estonia became available online. A company can be incorporated in minutes, a tax return submitted in record time, and most transactions completed without visiting any institution. This efficiency not only reduced time and cost — it reduced corruption and raised the level of trust between citizen and state.

Estonia did not stop at its geographic borders. It launched the "e-Residency" program, which allows anyone in the world to open and manage a company digitally through Estonia. This program transformed the country into a global business platform, attracting entrepreneurs from around the world.

In this context, it was no surprise that global technology companies such as Skype emerged from Estonia, and that the country became a fertile environment for startups. But the success was not the result of luck — it was the result of an integrated system: digital education, flexible laws, smart infrastructure, and a culture that encourages innovation.

Even crises were turned into opportunities. In 2007, Estonia was subjected to widespread cyberattacks. Rather than retreating, it invested heavily in cybersecurity and later became a global hub in the field, even hosting institutions affiliated with NATO.

What distinguishes the Estonian experience is not only its policies but their continuity. Governments changed, but the vision did not. There was no reversal or reconsideration of direction — only a long-term commitment to digital and economic transformation.

Today, Estonia is considered one of the most advanced countries in digital government and one of the fastest-growing economies in Eastern Europe. But it did not reach this position because of natural resources or geographic location — it did so because of a strategic decision to invest in people, technology, and institutions.

The lessons from this experience are clear, though not easy to apply. First, genuine reform requires boldness in decision-making and speed in execution. Second, education — especially technology-linked education — is the foundation of any economic transformation. Third, simplicity in laws and regulations is not a weakness but a strength. Fourth, trust between citizen and state is not an outcome — it is a prerequisite for success.

But perhaps the most important lesson is that nations are built not only by the resources they possess, but by what they choose to become. When I visited the smart city in Tallinn, Estonia's capital, those in charge told me that the buildings of this city were once prisons and torture centers used by the occupying power against political activists. When Estonia was liberated from the Soviets, Estonians transformed them — with simple modifications and minimal cost — into a smart city that others now look to as a model.

Estonia was not a wealthy country when it began, but it chose to be a smart one. It did not wait for resources — it created them through knowledge. It did not rely on the past — it built the future. And therein lies the conclusion: Estonia did not become an advanced nation because it was rich. It became rich because it decided to change.

Dr. Yusuf Mansur*

* The author is a former Minister of State for Economic Affairs. 

إستونيا، من القاعة إلى القمة

 أشارك في هذا المقال قصة نهوض ومسيرة دولة استونيا التنموية لما فيها من دروس وعبر. فهي احدى الدول المعجزة التي بدأت من الصفر أو ما يقاربه لتصبح من ضمن أكثر الدول تقدماً وتجربة يحتذى بها.

عندما حصلت إستونيا على استقلالها عام 1991 بعد انهيار الاتحاد السوفيتي، لم تكن تقف على أعتاب قصة نجاح، بل على حافة انهيار اقتصادي عميق. فالاقتصاد الاستوني حينذاك كان اقتصاد مركزي متداعٍ، مؤسساته شبه غائبة، عملته غير مستقرة، وبنيته التحتية ضعيفة.

كانت تلك لحظة تاريخية حرجة، حيث وجدت هذه الدولة الصغيرة نفسها أمام خيارين: إما محاولة إعادة إنتاج نموذج اقتصادي تقليدي بطيء، أو القفز مباشرة نحو المستقبل. اختارت إستونيا الطريق الأصعب والأذكى.

في أوائل التسعينيات، كان متوسط الدخل في إستونيا منخفضًا للغاية، ويُقدّر دخل الفرد بحوالي 3,000 دولار سنويًا، أي أقل من 250 دولار شهرياً. كانت الأجور متذبذبة بفعل التضخم والتحول النقدي. اليوم، وبعد ثلاثة عقود فقط، يصل الدخل السنوي للفرد إلى أكثر من 30,000 دولار (يتجاوز متوسط الأجر الشهري 2,500 دولار). هذا التحول ليس مجرد تحسن تدريجي، بل قفزة هيكلية تعكس إعادة بناء شاملة للاقتصاد والمجتمع.

ما الذي فعلته إستونيا ليحدث هذا التحول؟ البداية كانت بإصلاح اقتصادي جذري. لم تتردد الحكومة في تحرير الأسعار بسرعة، وخصخصة قطاعات واسعة، وفتح الاقتصاد أمام التجارة والاستثمار. كان الهدف واضحًا: الانتقال من اقتصاد مغلق غير كفؤ إلى اقتصاد سوق تنافسي ومندمج عالميًا. لكن الإصلاح لم يكن اقتصاديًا فقط، بل كان مؤسسيًا وفكريًا أيضًا. فبدل بناء نظام معقد، اختارت إستونيا البساطة كاستراتيجية.

في قلب هذه البساطة كان النظام الضريبي. تبنت إستونيا ضريبة دخل موحدة (نسبة واحدة للجميع) لكن الأهم أنها أضافت عنصرًا ثوريًا: إعفاء الأرباح المعاد استثمارها من الضريبة. بهذه الخطوة، تحوّل النظام الضريبي من أداة جباية إلى أداة تحفيز للنمو، وشجّع الشركات على التوسع بدل توزيع الأرباح.

لكن التحول الحقيقي لم يكن في الضرائب، بل في الإنسان. في عام 1996، أطلقت الحكومة برنامج "قفزة النمر"، الذي استهدف إدخال الإنترنت إلى المدارس وتدريب المعلمين ودمج التكنولوجيا في التعليم. لم يكن الهدف مجرد تحديث المناهج، بل بناء جيل رقمي بالكامل. هذا الجيل الذي تعلم البرمجة واستخدام التكنولوجيا منذ سن مبكرة أصبح لاحقًا العمود الفقري للاقتصاد الرقمي الإستوني.

بالتوازي مع ذلك، قررت إستونيا بناء دولة رقمية من الصفر. كل مواطن حصل على هوية رقمية تُستخدم في جميع المعاملات: من التصويت إلى دفع الضرائب إلى توقيع العقود. وتم إنشاء منصة "X-Road"، وهي بنية رقمية تربط جميع مؤسسات الدولة وتسمح بتبادل البيانات بشكل آمن وفعال دون مركزية. هذه المنصة لم تكن مجرد نظام تقني، بل كانت إعادة تعريف لكيفية عمل الدولة.

نتيجة لذلك، أصبحت 99% من الخدمات الحكومية في إستونيا متاحة عبر الإنترنت. يمكن تأسيس شركة خلال دقائق، وتقديم الإقرار الضريبي في وقت قياسي، وإجراء معظم المعاملات دون الحاجة إلى زيارة أي مؤسسة. هذه الكفاءة لم تقلل فقط من الوقت والتكلفة، بل قللت من الفساد، ورفعت مستوى الثقة بين المواطن والدولة.

ولم تتوقف إستونيا عند حدودها الجغرافية. أطلقت برنامج "e-Residency"، الذي يسمح لأي شخص في العالم بفتح شركة وإدارتها رقميًا من خلال إستونيا. هذا البرنامج حوّل الدولة إلى منصة عالمية للأعمال، وجذب رواد أعمال من مختلف أنحاء العالم.

في هذا السياق، لم يكن مفاجئًا أن تخرج من إستونيا شركات تكنولوجية عالمية، مثل سكايب Skype، وأن تتحول إلى بيئة خصبة للشركات الناشئة. لكن النجاح لم يكن نتيجة حظ، بل نتيجة منظومة متكاملة: تعليم رقمي، قوانين مرنة، بنية تحتية ذكية، وثقافة تشجع الابتكار.

حتى الأزمات تحولت إلى فرص. في عام 2007، تعرضت إستونيا لهجمات إلكترونية واسعة. بدل أن تتراجع، استثمرت بقوة في الأمن السيبراني، وأصبحت لاحقًا مركزًا عالميًا في هذا المجال، حتى أنها استضافت مؤسسات مرتبطة بـ حلف شمال الأطلسي (الناتو).

ما يميز التجربة الإستونية ليس فقط السياسات، بل الاستمرارية. الحكومات تغيّرت، لكن الرؤية لم تتغير. لم يكن هناك تراجع أو إعادة نظر في الاتجاه، بل التزام طويل الأمد بالتحول الرقمي والاقتصادي.

اليوم، تُعد إستونيا من أكثر الدول تقدمًا في الحكومة الرقمية، ومن أسرع الاقتصادات نموًا في أوروبا الشرقية. لكنها لم تصل إلى هذا الموقع بسبب الموارد الطبيعية أو الموقع الجغرافي، بل بسبب قرار استراتيجي بالاستثمار في الإنسان والتكنولوجيا والمؤسسات.

الدروس من هذه التجربة واضحة، لكنها ليست سهلة التطبيق. أولها أن الإصلاح الحقيقي يتطلب جرأة في اتخاذ القرار وسرعة في التنفيذ. ثانيها أن التعليم وخاصة التعليم المرتبط بالتكنولوجيا هو الأساس لأي تحول اقتصادي. ثالثها أن البساطة في القوانين والأنظمة ليست ضعفًا، بل قوة. ورابعها أن الثقة بين المواطن والدولة ليست نتيجة، بل شرط للنجاح.

لكن ربما أهم درس هو أن الدول لا تُبنى فقط بما تملكه من موارد، بل بما تختار أن تصبحه. فحين زُرت المدينة الذكية في تالين عاصمة استونيا، اعلمني القائمون عليها أن مباني هذه المدينة كانت سجون ومراكز تعذيب للناشطين السياسين يستخدمها المستعمر آنذاك، وحين تحررت أستونيا من السوفييت حولها الاستونيون وبتعديلات بسيطة وبأقل التكاليف الى مدينة ذكية يحتذى بها.

إستونيا لم تكن دولة غنية عندما بدأت، لكنها اختارت أن تكون دولة ذكية. لم تنتظر الموارد، بل صنعتها من خلال المعرفة. لم تعتمد على الماضي، بل بنت المستقبل. وهنا تكمن الخلاصة: لم تصبح إستونيا دولة متقدمة لأنها كانت غنية، بل أصبحت غنية لأنها قررت أن تتغير.

نشر هذا المقال في جريدة الرأي الاردنية

https://alrai.com/article/10956985/كتاب/إستونيا-من-القاع-إلى-القمة