Dr Yusuf Mansur*
Since Jordan pegged the dinar to
the U.S. dollar in 1995, the relationship between Jordanian and U.S. interest
rates has become one of the key determinants of monetary policy. Whenever the
U.S. Federal Reserve raises interest rates, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ)
faces a difficult question: Should it raise rates by the same amount to
preserve the attractiveness of the dinar, or does it have some room to maneuver
in response to domestic economic conditions?
The question may appear simple,
but it goes much deeper. The real issue is not whether Jordan should follow the
Federal Reserve, nor even whether interest rates in Jordan are high or low.
Rather, it is this: What is the minimum interest-rate differential between the
dinar and the dollar needed to preserve the stability of the dinar without
imposing unnecessarily high financing costs on the Jordanian economy?
Pegging the dinar to the dollar
does not necessarily mean that Jordanian interest rates must move
point-for-point with U.S. rates. Jordan’s own experience provides evidence of
this. An IMF study on monetary policy in Jordan found that Jordanian interest rates
responded less than one-for-one to movements in U.S. interest rates; in other
words, they did not fully mirror every rise and fall in Federal Reserve rates.
The study also found that the CBJ responded to domestic factors, particularly
inflation and the output gap (the difference between actual economic activity
and its potential level).
This means that despite the
exchange-rate peg, Jordan retains a degree of monetary policy space, although
that space is limited and varies over time. This finding helps us understand an
important point that is often overlooked in discussions of interest rates: the
interest-rate differential required to protect the dinar is not a fixed number.
When the economy is performing
well, economic growth is healthy, foreign reserves are strong, confidence in
the dinar is high, dollarization is low, and inflows from tourism, remittances, and investment are robust, the dinar does not necessarily require a large
interest-rate premium over the dollar. Under such conditions, interest rates
are not the only reason households and businesses choose to hold dinars.
Confidence, stability, growth, reserve adequacy, and external inflows all work
alongside interest rates.
The situation changes when growth
is weak, external inflows decline, reserves fall, or risks and uncertainty
increase. The interest-rate differential then becomes more important because
holding dollars may become relatively more attractive. The dinar may
consequently require a larger premium to compensate for risk and sustain demand
for the domestic currency.
The relationship we should
therefore consider is not: If U.S. interest rates rise, Jordanian rates must
rise by the same amount. Rather, the principle should be: The stronger Jordan’s
economic fundamentals, the smaller the interest-rate differential that may be
needed to maintain the stability of the dinar. The weaker those fundamentals
become, the greater the need for an interest-rate premium. Note that growth can
not be the only factor. The economy may record healthy growth while reserves
decline, external inflows deteriorate, or dollarization increases. Growth must
therefore be assessed alongside a broader set of indicators rather than in
isolation.
Jordan’s economic history
provides an important example. During the global financial crisis of 2008 and
2009, the CBJ lowered interest rates, but not as rapidly as the U.S. Federal
Reserve. As a result, the interest-rate differential widened in favor of the
dinar. At the time, the IMF noted that this differential enhanced the
attractiveness of dinar-denominated assets and contributed to the continued
accumulation of foreign reserves.
The CBJ subsequently reduced
interest rates gradually as conditions improved, without causing confidence in
the dinar to collapse. Deposits recovered, while the share of deposits
denominated in Jordanian dinars continued to rise. The experience shows
something more nuanced than simply saying that “high interest rates protect the
dinar.”
Additional interest-rate
protection is valuable when it is needed to preserve the attractiveness of the
dinar during difficult economic conditions. But it may provide very little
additional benefit—and may not be needed at all—when reserves are strong, confidence
is high, and the economy can sustain demand for the dinar with a smaller
premium.
This leads to a potentially
useful concept for Jordanian monetary policy: the “Warranted Interest-Rate
Differential.” This is the differential between Jordanian and U.S. interest
rates justified at any particular point in time by the state of foreign
reserves, economic growth, dollarization, inflation, liquidity, the external
account, tourism receipts, remittances, investment flows and the overall level
of risk.
The warranted differential can
then be compared with the actual interest-rate differential. If the actual
differential is close to the warranted differential, monetary policy has
broadly achieved the required balance between protecting the dinar and avoiding
unnecessary costs to the economy. But if the actual differential remains
substantially above what economic conditions warrant for an extended period,
the difference can be described as an “excess interest-rate premium.”
Such a premium is not costless.
Higher interest rates are transmitted, to varying degrees, into the borrowing
costs faced by businesses and households. They raise the cost of working
capital, investment and mortgage finance, and may slow credit growth. They also
increase the cost of refinancing public debt and influence investment
decisions. The economy could therefore find itself bearing an additional
economic cost in return for only a limited additional degree of monetary
protection. The objective, therefore, is not to achieve the lowest possible
interest rate, but the lowest sufficient interest rate.
For Jordan, the appropriate
interest rate is not simply the lowest rate the CBJ can announce. It is the
lowest rate capable of preserving confidence in the dinar, the exchange-rate
peg and foreign reserves without imposing an unnecessary financing premium on
the economy. This issue has become particularly relevant under current
conditions.
Jordan today has stronger
external buffers than it did during many previous periods. Gross foreign
reserves reached approximately $28.4 billion in August 2026, according to the
Central Bank of Jordan. The IMF had estimated usable reserves at the end of 2025
at 132% of its reserve-adequacy metric, while dollarization remained low and
confidence in the exchange-rate regime remained strong. Real GDP growth also
reached 2.93% in the first quarter of 2026.
These indicators do not
automatically mean that interest rates should be reduced. They do, however,
make the following question legitimate: With buffers this strong, does the
dinar require the same interest-rate differential it needed when reserves were weaker,
and risks were higher?
The answer can be estimated
empirically through what might be called a “time-varying minimum interest-rate
differential.” We should not be looking for a single number that applies to
Jordan in every year and under every economic circumstance. What matters is the
interest-rate differential required by the prevailing economic conditions.
*The author is a former
Jordanian Minister of State for Economic Affairs.
Published in Jordan Times/ 19 September 2026
https://jordantimes.com/opinion/yusuf-mansur/the-dinar-and-interest-rates-are-we-paying-more-than-necessary